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REGULATING PRIVATE LEGISLATION
Colin Scott*

I. INTRODUCTION
The development and application of binding rules has never been the sole
preserve of governments. Indeed, the medieval guilds undertook the bulk
of regulation relating to ‘trade, labour and production’ prior to the
emergence of modern nation states in Europe.1 Legal realists, writing in
the first half of the twentieth century, sought to expose the myth of state
sovereignty, pointing to the power of private actors both to enforce2 and
make law.3 Within contemporary discussions, recognition of private
legislation reflects both a desire to better understand the diffuse nature of
capacities underpinning regulatory and wider governance practices and a
concern respecting the legitimacy of such non-governmental rule making.
In this chapter I offer some analysis of the nature of private legislation. A
central consideration is what makes such rules binding – and there is no
single answer to this. The issue of bindingness alerts us to the existence of
a penumbral area of norms which appear to steer behaviour but without
any obvious means of legal enforcement. A further question relates to the

*

Colin Scott is the Vice-Principal for Research and Innovation, UCD College of
Business and Law and the Professor of EU Regulation and Governance, UCD School of
Law.
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Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (Harper Collins, London, 1982)
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Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State' (1923)
XXXVIII Political Science Quarterly 470-494
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Louis Jaffe, 'Law Making by Private Groups' (1937) 51 Harvard Law Review 201-253
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nature of private legislators. The second part of the chapter addresses the
normative issues concerning the legitimacy of non-governmental rulemaking. Legitimacy is a product both of effectiveness and the surrounding
mechanisms for review and accountability of private law makers. The
extent to which we are comfortable with private legislation may be a
product, to some extent, of the narratives we tell about their legitimacy.

II. THE NATURE OF PRIVATE LEGISLATION
A. WHO ARE THE PRIVATE LEGISLATORS?
Rules promulgated by non-governmental actors are an important part of
many governance regimes. In the United States the term ‘private
legislation’ is used to denote regimes for setting standards.4 There exist
vast numbers of standard setting organisations (SSOs) setting standards
for local, national and international purposes.5 Well known national SSOs,
established in the first quarter of the twentieth century, include the British
Standards Institution (BSI), the DIN (Germany), AFNOR (France) and the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI).6 These organisations
typically emerged through the institutionalisation of industry efforts to
make standards which would facilitate efficient business activities, often
with the support of government grants.

4

Chris Sagers ‘The Evolving Federal Approach to Private Legislation and the Twilight of
Government’ Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-117
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=610587 (last visited 28 October
20086)
5

Nils Brunsson and Bengt Jacobsson, 'The Contemporary Expansion of Standardization'
in N Brunsson, B Jacobsson and Associates (eds), A World of Standards (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2000) 1-17
6

Kristine Tamm Hallström, Organizing International Standardization: ISO and IASC in
Quest of Authority (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004)
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Standards institutions remain, fundamentally, industry bodies into which
industry expertise is drawn for the purpose of devising and testing
standards which are then marketed to anyone who wishes to use them.
Supranational standards bodies emerged to deal with coordination
problems not capable of solution with national standards alone. The
international organisation for standards, the ISO, itself, was constituted as
a network of national standard bodies, and similarly with the European
Committee for Standardisation, the CEN. Many other standards bodies are
also constituted as networks of industry or national representatives, often
incorporated as non-profit organisations.
Important as they are, standards, or technical standards, are not the only
form of rule made by non-governmental organisations. If standards
organisations have a loose associational form, in the sense that they
emerged from industry groupings, but now develop standards at large,
then we can distinguish tighter associational forms in which rules are set
within membership organisations. Such membership organisations include
sporting and community associations as well as trade associations and
many self-regulatory regimes. Trade associations frequently set rules for
their members which may be concerned with protecting each other from
undesirable conduct of others, or with ensuring the reputation of an
industry amongst its customers. (Some argue that such regimes may also
be used to underpin cartels).7 Trade association ‘codes of conduct’ have
statutory recognition in the EC Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
where they are defined as an
‘agreement or set of rules not imposed by law, regulation or
administrative provision of a Member State which defines the
behaviour of traders who undertake to be bound by the code’.8

7

See eg Daniel J. Marx, International Shipping Cartels: A Study of Industrial SelfRegulation by Shipping Conferences (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953)
8

Directive 2005/29/EC. OJ 2005 L149 22-39, 11.06.2005, art 2(f).

4
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In some domains legislative underpinning gives to trade or professional
associations a monopoly over particular areas. Such a monopoly position
may otherwise be achieved through an association acquiring a reputation
amongst its members, for example with a sporting association, or among
the customers of the members, as being the best in respect of one or more
important criteria.9
The standards organisations are not the only examples of associational
regimes whose scope has grown beyond the confines of the association.
Advertising regulation in many European countries is at least partially the
responsibility of ‘self-regulatory’ organisations established and funded by
the advertising industry, but whose rules are applied to all advertisers,
irrespective of whether they are a member of the relevant association.
Some idea of the scale of the activities may be gauged from the fact that
the European Advertising Standards Alliance has member organisations
which are self regulatory organisations in 24 European countries.10
In addition to associational regimes, private rules are made within bilateral
relationships in the form of contracts. Contracts are routinely used by one
party to set down rules of conduct over another.11 Supply contracts
provide a classic example where buyers or goods or services set down not
only quality and price conditions, but also rules relating to process,
certification or inspection. Buyers who exercise monopsony, or otherwise
have substantial power relative to the other party, are particularly well
placed to use contracts in this way. In some instances chains of contract
may emerge, as where retailers impost conditions on distributors relating

9

Antony Ogus, 'Re-Thinking Self-Regulation' (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
97-108.
10

Colin Scott, 'Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of
Contemporary Governance' (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 56-76

11

Arthur Stinchcombe, 'Contracts as Hierarchical Documents' in A Stinchcombe and C
Heimer (eds), Organizational Theory and Project Management (Universitetsforlaget,
Bergen, 1985
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to provenance of goods, which distributors must then incorporate in their
contracts with their suppliers. Insurance contracts are similarly used by
insurers to set down conditions of conduct underpinning the acceptance of
the risk.12
In many domains the rules set down in the contracts which are effectively
imposed by one party on the other are actually drawn up by a third party.
It is very common within professional and trade associations for members
to be offered ‘boilerplate’ contracts which have been drawn up by the
association, and through which the association is effectively able to set
down rules not only for its members, but also for the customers of its
members. It has been suggested that when it comes to the interpretation of
such contract terms the intention lying behind them is better gauged by
reference to the intention of the organisation which drafted the boilerplate
terms, rather by the more normal reference to the intention of the
contracting parties.13

B. WHAT MAKES PRIVATE LEGISLATION BINDING?
The question of how private legislation becomes binding is no more
capable of precise answer than is the more general question of why laws
are followed. Laws are followed to varying degrees because the norms are
reflective of wider social values and/or because it is in the interests of the
rule-follower to do so (for example to avoid sanctions or to secure
benefits). Where norms are internalised then no consideration of

12

Richard V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle and Dean Barry, Insurance as Governance
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2003)

13

Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati ‘Contract as Statute’ NYU Law and Economics
Research Papers 06/06 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=872861 (last
visited 1 November 2006).
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consequences is necessary for a rule-follower to decide to follow the rule.
In practice it is likely that internalisation of rules is reinforced to a greater
or lesser extent by the fact of consequences for non-compliant behaviour.
The possibility of consequences is, of course, dependent on the deviation
being detected. Accordingly it is necessary to think about the range of
consequences which may follow from failure to follow rules generally,
and the rules contained within private legislation in particular.
What is clear with legal rules generally is that they are not followed
simply because of the threat of sanctions exercised hierarchically.14 This is
equally true with private legislation. The basis for bindingness with
private legislation is diverse, even at the level of hierarchical enforcement.
In the case of private legislation made under delegated legislative
authority, as with codes and practices by some professional associations,
the legal basis for enforcement is often based in administrative law, with
the possibility of administrative sanctions.
With the various forms of contractual rules, whether made through
associations or in bilateral contractual settings, the bindingness of the rules
derives from the contracts themselves and can be enforced as such.
Associational rules are liable to provide not only the substantive rules of
conduct, but also the mechanisms governing membership and expulsion.
Thus where provision is made in the rules of the association then a
member consistently in breach can be subjected not only to financial or
other penalties but also expulsion from the regime itself. This is an
equivalent to the measure in public regimes of revoking an operating
licence. Where membership is a de iure or de facto prerequisite to
participation in a market, then, as with licence revocation, expulsion may
be tantamount to killing off the business. The nuclear qualities of this
sanction may appear to make a regime rigorous. However, in practice the
drastic consequences associated with expulsion may make it appear
disproportionate for all but the most severe violations, and therefore
practically unusable. It is in any case very difficult to secure information
on the sanctioning practices of contractually based associational regimes

14

Sharon L. Roach Anleu, Law and Social Change (Sage, London, 2000).
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and this is in marked contrast with the detailed reporting practices which
typically characterise public regulatory regimes.
In the case of bilateral contracts it is for the parties to specify
consequences for breach, or otherwise rely on the default rules provided
by legislation or common law (depending on jurisdiction). Where
boilerplate terms are used then the organisation drafting the terms will
typically make provision for breach. What is clear from sociological
research on the relations between businesses in contractual settings is that
many businesses pay little attention to their strict contractual rights, even
where things go wrong.15 A possible conclusion arising from this research
is that in many settings the rules are not so important in making the
relationship work as other mechanisms are used by the parties to keep
matters within an acceptable range of outcomes. These alternative
mechanisms derive from the position of social actors within community
and market settings.
In some instances failure to comply with the requirements of private
legislation may result in social consequences deriving from the location of
the actors within communities. This is likely to be particularly true for
rules developed within professional associations and other community
settings. Thus a doctor or lawyer who breaches professional codes may
find themselves being ostracised by other members of the profession
before the question of formal sanctions within the regime ever becomes an
issue. Within bilateral contractual settings, to the extent that legal
enforcement of rights is not deployed, or not fully deployed, then social
sanctions are liable to have a role in addressing breaches. The social
character of the people who make up businesses may lead them to seek
approval, inclusion, status within contractual settings, giving others
mechanisms for denying them some of the things they seek as a
consequence of deviation from the rules (whether written or unwritten).

15

Stuart Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study' (1963)
28 American Sociological Review 55-83; Hugh Beale and Tony Dugdale, 'Contracts
Between Businessmen' (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45-60
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A third set of consequences flow from market behaviour. Where a
business or professional is known to be in breach of applicable private
legislation then potential customers may decide not to deal with them, or
not to continue to deal with them (exit). Perhaps the clearest example here
relates to technical standards, compliance with which is a sine qua non for
businesses operating in many economic areas. This reason for following
rules has been described as rational voluntary market behaviour.16 Failure
to comply may make doing business impossible. Equally, the market
consequences of expulsion from an associational regime may provide the
real reason for compliance with the rules, albeit mediated by a process of
hierarchical enforcement against offending members. Within bilateral
contractual settings, many contracts have relational qualities, such that
there are market incentives to maintain good relations and thus sustain
some kind of joint enterprise. Accordingly, even where there are legally
enforceable penalties for breach of contract, the capacity of one actor to
contract elsewhere may be a more important reason for compliance with
the rules. Indeed, it has been argued that in some spheres, such as
employment relations, implicit relational contracts may trump strict legal
rights in short term contracts.17
In practice the mechanisms which make private legislation binding are
likely to be found not in isolation, but rather operating in hybrid forms. In
many cases the application of social sanctions is likely to overlap with
market behaviour. This phenomenon is exemplified by the movement for
developing and regulating sustainable logging practices established by the
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC established a code and
encouraged retailers to require suppliers to ensure that all wood products
supplied to them were produced in compliance with the code. Thus the
social norms institutionalised in the code are reinforced by the market
behaviour of retailers refusing to deal with suppliers unable to guarantee

16

Kristine Tamm Hallström, Organizing International Standardization: ISO and IASC in
Quest of Authority (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004)

17

Clive Bull, 'The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts' (1987) 102 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 147-159
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compliance with the code – a process referred to by Cashore as ‘non-state
market-driven governance’.18 The potential for such hybrid consequences
for failure to follow the norms of private rules is accentuated by a trend
observed in the United States and elsewhere for at least some consumers
to seek information about the production of products they consumer, and
the compliance by produces with ethical codes.19
Equally market-based sanctions might operate in combination with
hierarchical enforcement. Whilst technical standards are generally adopted
by businesses for market reasons, there are often circumstances where it is
desirable that a standard is followed universally, but there is inadequate
market incentive to insure this. There are many instances where technical
standards are referred to in legislative instruments. Sometimes such
references are specific – as with the ‘no product to be lawfully sold unless
complying with the standard’ type of regulation common in the UK, and
also used by agencies in the United States20 or in the kind of general terms
favoured by the New Approach to Technical Standards, adopted by the
European Commission in 1983.21 The New Approach deploys a more
generalised approach within which general requirements are set down in
legislation with detailed requirements supplied by technical standards
from European or national standards bodies. The General Product Safety

18

Benjamin Cashore, 'Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance:
How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule Making
Authority' (2002) 15 Governance 503-529

19

Douglas A. Kysar, 'Preferences for Processes' (2004) 118 Harvard Law Review 525642

20

Jody Freeman, 'Private parties, public functions and the new administrative law' (2000)
52(3) Administrative Law Review 813-858

21

Michelle Egan, 'Regulatory Strategies, Delegation and European Market Integration'
(1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy 485-506; Giandomenico Majone, 'The
Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation' (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market
Studies 273-302
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Directive locates technical standards within a hierarchy of rules, such that
the general safety requirement of the Directive may be complied with
through following technical standards where no more specific EC or
national legislative rules govern the product.22
The use of technical standards is not the only mechanism for incorporation
of private legislation within regulatory regimes. Within the European
Community regime on consumer protection there have been marked
efforts to link voluntary codes of conduct with hierarchical sanctions. One
of the best examples is provided by the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive which requires Member States to provide administrative or
criminal sanctions for misleading conduct by traders and provides:
‘A commercial practice shall also be regarded as misleading
if…it involves…
1. Non-compliance by the trader with commitments
contained in codes of conduct by which the trader has
undertaken to be bound, where
2. the commitment is not aspiration but is firm and is
capable of being verified, and
3. the trader indicates in commercial practice that he is
bound by the code.’23

22

Directive 2001/95/EC OJ L 11/4-17, 15.01. 2002 Art 3(2) (previously Directive
92/59/EEC on general product safety OJ L 228, 11.8.1992, p. 24–32).

23

Directive 2005/29/EC. OJ 2005 L149 22-39. 11.06.2005, art 6(2)(b).
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III. THE LEGITIMACY OF PRIVATE LEGISLATORS
The very concept ‘private legislation’ implies some normative problem,
the appropriation by non-state actors of an essentially public function, the
challenge to Weber’s idea that the state was characterised by its monopoly
of the legitimate use of force against others. Within democratic states the
core usage of the term legislation implies rule making through
representative legislative institutions, organised variously around
principles of majority decision making or power-sharing, each with
mechanisms for the protection of minorities.24 Normative concerns about
‘private legislation’ are commonly premised on this ideal-typical
conception of public legislation. However, we should be aware that in
many states the delegation of public legislative authority to ministers and
others means that in practice a majority of public legislative instruments
are adopted with limited or negligible involvement of the core legislative
institutions. Furthermore many rules made by public bodies are made in a
manner which does not involves the processes of public legislation, as
with many contractual rules, and soft law instruments such as guidance
and circulars. Thus, while we might accept the special qualities, in terms
of legitimacy, attached to public legislation, we should not take as our
starting point an assumption that most public rule making is carried out
through such special processes. Any discussion should perhaps start from
a comparison of the legitimacy of rule making by private as opposed to
public bureaucracies.
A key example within the EU of this normative problem is presented by
the dependence on private standards in the legislative frameworks of the
New Approach to Technical Standards. For Majone there is a ‘tension
between the essential safety requirements of the New Approach directives,
which are legally binding, and the voluntary character of the harmonized
standards which provide the technical framework for risk assessment’
expressed in terms that the non-state provenance of the standards means

24

Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984)
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that they must be voluntary.25 The extent of the problem he sees is
illustrated by his solution, which is to assign the standard setting to
governmental agencies. He values the legitimacy and expertise of the
standardisation bodies, but cannot accommodate private rule making
within his theory of (public) governance.
The apparent legitimacy problem attaching to private legislation can be
turned on its head in a number of ways. A first step is to understand ‘the
pervasive private role’ of non-state actors in contemporary governance26
and with this accept that the option of governmental organisations ‘reclaiming’ all legislative functions is implausible. Accordingly alternative
bases for the legitimacy of the governance regimes we have (rather than
those which we think ideal) must be sought.
Legitimacy is widely conceived of as having both procedural and
substantive dimensions.27 From a procedural point of view the
involvement of non-state actors in making ‘legislation’ begs the question
whether such processes are subjected to similar procedural safeguards to
the processes attaching to public legislation. Public legislators point to
traditional mechanisms of political and financial accountability to which
they are subjected as underpinning their procedural legitimacy.28 Thus,
ministers and agencies with responsibilities for making rules may have to
account for their actions before parliaments, the courts, financial

25

Giandomenico Majone, 'The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation' (2000) 38
Journal of Common Market Studies 273-302

26

Jody Freeman, 'The private role in public governance' (2000) 75(3) New York
University Law Review 543-675

27

Fritz W. Scharpf, Interdependence and Democratic Legitimation, Max Planck Institute
for the Study of Socieities, 98/2 (1998)

28

Jody Freeman, 'The private role in public governance' (2000) 75(3) New York
University Law Review 543-675
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watchdogs and/or public sector grievance handlers.29 However we need
not assume that such public accountability mechanisms are always robust.
For some commentators the rise of the regulatory state in the UK
generated a crisis in the accountability of public rule makers, more remote
from government ministries and parliaments than had hitherto been the
case.30 In particular it is possible to note the somewhat remote and
sporadic nature of such key processes as parliamentary scrutiny or judicial
review.31 One might argue that the trade-off for having expertise and
independence in regulatory agencies, in terms of the reduced intensity of
formal accountability mechanisms, is not dissimilar to that which applies
to private legislative processes.
For some the involvement of private actors in core governance activities
raises qualitatively different issues. Writing in an American context,
Freeman suggests ‘[t]o the extent that private actors increasingly perform
traditionally public functions unfettered by the scrutiny that normally
accompanies the exercise of public power, private participation may
indeed raise accountability concerns that dwarf the problem of unchecked
agency discretion.’32
Set against the criteria of public accountability, we might conclude that the
arrangements for scrutiny of private rule makers are weak. Where no
public expenditure is involved, the more rigorous aspects of public sector
audit are unlikely to apply and there is limited experimentation in some

29

Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies
(Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003)
30

Cosmo Graham, Is There a Crisis in Regulatory Accountability?, CRI (1995) .

31

Colin Scott, 'Accountability in the Regulatory State' (2000) 27 Journal of Law and
Society 38-60.

32

Jody Freeman, 'Private parties, public functions and the new administrative law' (2000)

52(3) Administrative Law Review 813-858
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jurisdictions with applying judicial review procedures to private
organisations deemed to be involved in exercising public powers to make
and/or enforce rules.33 The argument for applying judicial review more
extensively to non-state actors was powerfully made by Allan Hutchinson
some years ago. 34
An approach premised on the desirability of applying public law
mechanisms to private actors appears to me to over-emphasise one set of
legitimating mechanisms, at the expense of others which are to a greater or
lesser extent, particular to non-state actors. I suggest that a more fruitful
approach might be to think first about the advantages, from a legitimacy
perspective, of the involvement of non-state actors within governance
regimes generally, and second to think more precisely about the various
mechanisms through which non-state activities are themselves legitimated,
which often go beyond traditional mechanisms of public accountability.
The virtue we might identify in having private legislative processes is
precisely that they have the potential to add additional layers of scrutiny
and accountability for legislation creating what I have referred to
elsewhere as a form of ‘extended accountability’ premised on
interdependence and/or redundancy.35 The idea of interdependence is
premised on the observation that in many settings key actors lack the
capacity to act alone, and in order to bring actions to fruition they require
the cooperation of others. Such an idea is clearly demonstrated in the
public regimes where reference is made to private legislation, as with the
New Approach to Technical Standards. It is suggested that administrative
law should be adapted to the reality of interdependence through a

33

Julia Black, 'Constitutionalising Self-Regulation' (1996) 59(1) Modern Law Review
24-56
34

Allan Hutchinson, 'Mice Under a Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Adminstrative
State' (1990) 40 University of Toronto Law Journal 374-404
35

Colin Scott, 'Accountability in the Regulatory State' (2000) 27 Journal of Law and
Society 38-60
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reconceptualisation of its main subject matter from hierarchical to
negotiated relationships.36
With redundancy the core idea is that the failure of any one mechanism, in
this case for setting norms, will be met by another overlapping
mechanism. It is demonstrated by the hierarchy of norms established
within the EC Directive on Product Safety, discussed above, under which
satisfaction of the requirement that products are safe may be provided by
compliance with EU or national legislative requirements and, failing these,
European or national non-governmental standards. It may be that in the
case the redundancy mechanism would not work so effectively since a
poor legislative standard trumps a better private standard. It is not open to
a court to choose which standards within the hierarchy to apply. We may
expect redundancy to provide a more effective mechanism where public
and private rules are, in some sense, in competition with each other.
Thinking beyond interdependence and redundancy the existence of private
legislative capacity might be expected to supplement public accountability
mechanisms over public legislators. The existence of standardisation and
self-regulatory organisations provides a concentrated expertise and
capacity for checking the credibility of public legislative programmes in
the same fields of interest, and this checking capacity flows in both
directions, as public legislative and executive institutions have capacity for
monitoring private legislative institutions. At the level of bilateral
contractual rules, the capacity for deviation from public rules creates the
potential for innovation and challenge to the quality of such public rules.
Contracting parties, in many settings, can effectively choose whether to
take the default rules or set their own.37 The will of public legislatures to
override such private contractual rule making, which is routinely exercised
in consumer protection fields, must be justified by reference to the public
rules being superior, and this, also is a form of accountability.

36

Jody Freeman, 'The private role in public governance' (2000) 75(3) New York
University Law Review 543-675

37

Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999)
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This last point links to arguments about substantive legitimacy.
Substantive legitimacy is premised upon the outcomes or effects of rule.
The existence of private legislative regimes might be expected to create
competitive pressures, both between private rules regimes and between
private and public legislation. Processes of technical standardisation are,
perhaps, most obviously, subjected to competition for users of the
standards.38 Self-regulatory regimes may compete for members and for
customers of their members, the latter pressures pulling standards up, and
the former towards the least costly standards consistent with maintaining
market reputation.39
Turning to the private legislators themselves, I have noted considerable
variety in the forms which they take. Whilst they may be subjected to less
intense accountability structures of the traditional public kind, we could
expect certain forms of private legislator to be subject to other
mechanisms which are generally weaker for public legislators. We can
distinguish two sets of alternatives to the traditional ‘hierarchical’
accountability structures, rooted in competition and community.
I have noted already the observation that private standards bodies are
subject to the competitive pressures of the market in the sense that they
sell their standards to potential users. Such standards will be taken up
where there are market advantages in doing so. In some instances
competing private standards may emerge, with potential outcomes
including the persistence of more than one standard, or the success of one
and the failure of another. Researchers taking an interest in such
competitive processes have often noted that the success or failure of a
standard under these conditions is not necessarily directly linked to how
good it is. Thus the technically better standard may fail because of factors
external to its quality, and a poorer standard may succeed. The example of

38

Kristine Tamm Hallström, Organizing International Standardization: ISO and IASC in
Quest of Authority (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004)

39

Antony Ogus, 'Re-Thinking Self-Regulation' (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 97-108
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the QWERTY keyboard, which has survived from the typewriter age into
the computer age, comes to mind.40
Competitive pressures may, as noted, be expected amongst self-regulatory
regimes, also, as they vie for members and their members for customers.41
Where ordinary businesses exert regulatory power through contracts their
activities are subject to ordinary market processes, including, to a greater
or lesser extent, the disciplines of both capital and consumer markets. A
key argument in favour of policies of privatization in respect of state
owned enterprises is that it frees such businesses from bureaucratic
control, whilst introducing the different discipline of the capital market
which, in industries dependent on major infrastructure investment, might
be expected to involve a good deal of scrutiny of the manner in which
investments is made.42
Associational regimes are subject to other pressures also, deriving from
the very fact of members being more or less loosely associated with them.
Community-based control and accountability is likely to be a larger
feature of smaller or more homogenous associations. Many professional
associations benefit from a high degree of homogeneity in terms of the
training and values of the members. Legal and medical professions
provide key examples. Consequently there is a form of accountability to
the members which, to the extent that members are active in asserting
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virtuous values and processes, may be expected to assert through forms of
peer pressure. Similarly, standard-setting regimes in respect of particular
sectors are liable to benefit from a high degree of homogeneity in respect
of critical matters. Many features of the development of standards in
software for the internet are said to exhibit high degrees of community in
the way things are done and, implicitly, also in the way conduct is
regulated.
From the perspective of this chapter perhaps the most threatening private
legislative regimes are the ‘total’ ones, where characteristics of
interdependence, redundancy, competition and community are all lacking
and where the private rule maker has a monopoly not just over the rule
making but also over interpretation and enforcement. Bilateral contracts in
monopsonistic or monopolistic settings appear to best exemplify this
situation. The former would include supply contracts where the purchaser
is the sole purchaser of products from one company (for example for ownlabel clothing production) and the latter would include situational or other
monopoly selling situations involving services. Franchise agreements
frequently have the latter characteristic, where the franchisee is effectively
locked into the agreement because their business is so dependent on it. In
some other instances the presence of a number of sellers makes little
difference if, in practice, they impose similar terms on their customers,
whether using boilerplate terms derived from a trade association, or
through some other process of convergence. It has often been noted that
standard form contracts commonly reflect the balance of power between
the parties, and can act as an instrument for the exercise of unequal
power.43
In the case of these ‘total regimes’ the foregoing analysis is suggestive of
an approach which might argue for greater application of each of the main
sets of legitimating mechanisms rooted in hierarchy, competition and
community. The first approach is exemplified in the approach of the EC to
unfair terms in consumer contracts. The EC Directive on Unfair Terms in
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Consumer Contracts provides for each member state to establish
mechanisms for proactive review of contract terms by administrative
agencies and representative groups, with powers to negotiate amendment
to terms defined in the Directive as unfair and to seek court orders to
prevent continued use of the offending terms where such negotiations
fail.44 Such a hierarchical regulatory approach would be less likely to
commend itself in the context of B2B contracts such as franchise and
supply agreements, since businesses are more commonly expected to look
after their own interests. There is, in some circumstances, the possibility of
resort to competition law remedies, as occurs in the case of franchising.45
A second approach is to invoke competitive pressures to seek to exert
control over private rule makers. Schemes under which self-regulatory
rules are presented voluntarily for approval to regulatory agencies have
this characteristic. The regime offers to businesses the possibility of using
a label of agency approval, which would be calculated to raise the
confidence of consumers and thus market reputation. These features
enable the agency to set down minimum standards for codes (for example
that they should include effective redress mechanisms) and to negotiate
over improvement of draft codes as a condition of approval. A new
approved codes scheme operated by the UK Office of Fair Trading has
met with rather less success in attracting businesses to seek approval than
did earlier versions of the regime dating from the 1970s.46 This analysis
emphasises the market reasons for participating in the code approvals
scheme, and the concomitant legitimating role of agency approvals,
though there are clearly other mechanisms operating here, which may
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include hierarchy and community. Equally there are other competitionbased mechanisms for asserting controls over private legislation, for
example by requiring greater transparency in respect of key terms within
standard term contracts, enabling contracting parties to shop around more
not just over key quality/price issues , but also in respect of other terms.47
A third approach to legitimating private regulation is to seek to boost the
community-based dimension to control and accountability of a regime.
One way to do this is to promote the formation of associations of private
regulators operating in similar spheres which might be expected to engage
in such processes as benchmarking and peer review of each others
activities. This, in a sense, is what has happened in the international
community of standards organisations which operates through a loose
network coordinated by the ISO and which might be expected to promote
the best ways of working in standards bodies in all countries. Thus, a
national standards body, though it might appear to fall outside of
traditional accountability structures for public bodies, is firmly embedded
within a structure which requires a form of accounting to its community
for its activities. Similarly franchising associations which exist in a
number of countries provide a focus for both franchisors and franchisees
in seeking to enhance the viability of franchising arrangements by
promoting confidence in the fairness of franchising agreements. The
International Franchising Association has a Code of Ethics which is
concerned with similar objectives.48
It is, of course, an empirical question how well different mechanisms for
legitimating private legislation might work in practice. The analysis
offered in this chapter offers an array of mechanisms for addressing
deficits which are perceived or discovered.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have suggested that the wide array of mechanisms and
organisations through which “private legislation” is elaborated require a
more robust analytical framework if the full variety is to be captured. I
have offered some suggestions here as to how such an analysis might be
developed, classifying different forms of private legislator and various
mechanisms of bindingness. I have noted that a number of the most potent
private legislative forms do not necessarily depend on legal bindingness
for their power. The importance of private legislation lies not just in that
fact that ‘there is a lot of it about’ but also in the observation that there
may be things which private legislators can do which are not open to
public legislators due to lack of resources or authority. Thus private
legislation may offer solutions to public policy problems and should be
considered in these terms.
The observation and use of private legislation within public policy regimes
raises the normative issues concerning the fragmentation of power and the
assignment or at least recognition of the contribution of private legislation
to public regimes. The suggestion offered in this chapter is that a superior
narrative relating to the legitimacy of private legislation is required which
recognises the array of mechanisms which are available. The default
position might be that legislation stemming from an associational regime
should be thought of as being legitimated by the mechanisms typical of
such regimes, such as peer review, application of social or market
sanctions for breach of key norms and so on. Where such mechanisms are
deficient I have identified an array of alternatives which might be
developed to correct the deficits.

